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\"This book is a guide to claims about the proper role of government and markets in a global economy\"--Provided by publisher.

This book is a guide to claims about the proper role of government and markets in a global economy. Moving between systematic comparison of nineteen rich democracies and debate about what the United States can do to restore a more civilized, egalitarian and fair society, Harold L. Wilensky tells us how six of these countries got on a low road to economic progress and which components of their labor-crunch strategy are uniquely American. He provides an overview of the impact of major dimensions of globalization, only one of which – the interaction of the internationalization of finance and the rapid increase in the autonomy of central banks – undermines either national sovereignty or job security, labor standards, and the welfare state. Although Wilensky views American policy and politics through the lens of globalization, he concludes that the nation-state remains the center of personal identity, social solidarity and political action.

In this landmark work, the culmination of 30 years of systematic, comprehensive comparison of 19 rich democracies, Wilensky answers two basic questions: (1) What is distinctly modern about modern societies--in what ways are they becoming alike? (2) How do variations in types of political economy shape system performance? He specifies similarities and differences in the structure and interplay of government, political parties, the mass media, industry, labor, professions, agriculture, churches, and voluntary associations. He then demonstrates how differences in bargaining arrangements among these groups lead to contrasting policy profiles and patterns of taxing and spending, which in turn explain a large number of outcomes: economic performance, political legitimacy, equality, job security, safety and risk, real health, the reduction of poverty and environmental threats, and the effectiveness and fairness of regulatory regimes. Drawing on quantitative data and case studies covering the last 50 years and more than 400 interviews he conducted with top decision-makers and advisors, Wilensky provides a richly detailed account of the common social, economic, and labor problems modern governments confront and their contrasting styles of conflict resolution. The result is new light on the likely paths of development of rich democracies as they become richer. Assessing alternative theories, Wilensky offers a powerful critique of such images of modern society as \"post-industrial\" or \"high-tech,\" \"the information age\" or the alleged dominance of \"globalization.\" Because he systematically compares all of the rich democracies with at least three million population, Wilensky can specify what is truly exceptional about the United States, what it shares with Britain and Britain abroad (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and what it shares with all or almost all of the West European democracies, Israel, and Japan. He gives careful attention to which successful social and labor policies are transferable across nations and which are not.Rich Democracieswill interest both scholars and practitioners. It combines the perspectives of political economy (the interplay of markets and politics) and political sociology (the social bases of politics). It will be especially useful in courses on comparative political economy, comparative politics, European politics, public policy, political sociology, the welfare state, American government, advanced industrial societies, and industrial relations.

Drawing on research analyzing similarities and differences among 19 rich democracies, this article compares the economic performance of big spenders and lean spenders at a similar economic level from 1950 to the late 1990s. Going beyond aggregate public spending, it shows the contrasting effects of particular types of spending and taxing and particular social policies. I highlight the extraordinary continuity of the contrasting institutions and policy directions of these countries. I find that there is not one road to good economic performance, but several. I specify five types of political economy, each with its own costs and gains in people's well-being, both economic and noneconomic. A final summary compares extremes: the confrontational \"low road\" pursued by the USA and the \"high road\" pursued by the strongest consensual democracies of Continental Europe, where social partners have negotiated real reforms in expensive social policies while preserving social cohesion. /// Réfléchissant sur les recherches qui analysent les similitudes et différences de 19 riches démocraties, cet article compare la performance économique des États très dépensiers et faiblement dépensiers dans le même secteur économique, de 1950 à la fin des années 1990. Allant au-delà des dépenses publiques globales, il montre les effets contrastés de types particuliers de dépense et d'impôt, et de politiques sociales spécifiques. Je mets en évidence la continuité extraordinaire des diverses institutions et orientations politiques de ces pays. Je constate qu'il n'y a pas une voie de la bonne performance économique, mais plusieurs. J'indique cinq types d'économie politique, aux coûts et gains propres au regard du bien-être des personnes, tant au plan économique que non économique. Un résumé final compare des extrêmes: la \"voie basse\" conflictuelle poursuivie par les États-Unis et la \"voie haute\" poursuivie par les plus fortes démocraties consensuelles d'Europe continentale, où les partenaires sociaux ont négocié de vraies réformes des coûteuses politiques sociales tout en préservant la cohésion sociale.

In this landmark work, the culmination of 30 years of systematic, comprehensive comparison of 19 rich democracies, Wilensky answers two basic questions: (1) What is distinctly modern about modern societies--in what ways are they becoming alike? (2) How do variations in types of political economy shape system performance? He specifies similarities and differences in the structure and interplay of government, political parties, the mass media, industry, labor, professions, agriculture, churches, and voluntary associations. He then demonstrates how differences in bargaining arrangements among these groups lead to contrasting policy profiles and patterns of taxing and spending, which in turn explain a large number of outcomes: economic performance, political legitimacy, equality, job security, safety and risk, real health, the reduction of poverty and environmental threats, and the effectiveness and fairness of regulatory regimes. Drawing on quantitative data and case studies covering the last 50 years and more than 400 interviews he conducted with top decision-makers and advisors, Wilensky provides a richly detailed account of the common social, economic, and labor problems modern governments confront and their contrasting styles of conflict resolution. The result is new light on the likely paths of development of rich democracies as they become richer. Assessing alternative theories, Wilensky offers a powerful critique of such images of modern society as \"post-industrial\" or \"high-tech, \" \"the information age\" or the alleged dominance of \"globalization.\" Because he systematically compares all of the rich democracies with at least three million population, Wilensky can specify what is truly exceptional about the United States, what it shares with Britain and Britain abroad (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and what it shares with all or almost all of the West European democracies, Israel, and Japan. He gives careful attention to which successful social and labor policies are transferable across nations and which are not. Rich Democracies will interest both scholars and practitioners. It combines the perspectives of political economy (the interplay of markets and politics) and political sociology (the social bases of politics). It will be especially useful in courses on comparative political economy, comparative politics, European politics, public policy, political sociology, the welfare state, American government, advanced industrial societies, and industrial relations.

It is tempting to oversell the practical value of applied research. A hard look at the effects of U.S. social science on public policy in areas such as active labor market policies (training, job creation, placement, etc.), crime prevention, fiscal policy, poverty reduction, and health care reform suggests an inverse relationship between social science consensus and policy and budgetary decisions. Fragmented and decentralized political economies (e.g., the United States) foster policy segmentation and isolated, short-run single-issue research-often politicized and misleading. More corporatist democracies (such as Sweden, Norway, Austria, and Germany) evidence a tighter relation between knowledge and power in which a wider range of issues is connected, longer-range effects are sometimes considered, and research is more often actually used for planning and implementation. Even in less hospitable societies, however, social science does make its way in the long run. Favorable conditions and examples are discussed.

Although America leads the world in conducting social scientific evaluations of public policies, in the end, social science contributes less to policymaking here than it does in most of Western Europe and Japan. Instead, our research has little bearing on whether a government program lives or dies. Intellectuals typically have tense relationships with men and women of power, but the disconnect between research and policy is most extreme in the United States.

I began by observing that “crisis” talk, however misleading, is universal. But has the action of governments matched the rhetoric of antispending campaigns? What cutbacks have actually occurred in the period of austerity after 1975 or 1980 when economic growth and productivity growth slowed down? With some exceptions, the core programs of the welfare state – pensions, disability insurance, and national health insurance, programs that have generally outpaced GDP growth – have proved most resistant to real cuts in benefits per capita or even in their GDP shares. Most vulnerable to real cuts or at least spending restraint have been education, social assistance, unemployment compensation, and family allowances (but not child care or parental leave).With few exceptions, there are five main reasons for this pattern of growth and restraint. First, demography, although it is not destiny, does count. Declines in education spending reflect declines in school-age populations. The “young” countries with a school-age bulge cut education expenditures per child while still raising such spending as a share of GDP, but as the school population declined, the GDP share leveled off or declined. The “older” countries spent more on pensions both per capita and in GDP share but at a diminishing rate, eventually leveling off (Lindert, 2004: vol. 1). Aging, as we have seen, also increased health and disability spending, especially as the “old-old” increased their share of the population. Second, after universal coverage is achieved, various measures to control costs or restructure programs have some effect, especially in health care (as in German reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s). Third, programs where abuses are obvious and widespread (sick pay, disability insurance) have evoked substantial government reform efforts with varying success; disability cutbacks have encountered especially fierce resistance (Wilensky, 2002: ch. 15 and table 15.3). Fourth, the rate of economic growth has an automatic effect on these numbers: below-average growth will automatically increase the expenditure ratio (SS/GDP) as the denominator levels off or decreases while social spending continues upward or grows slowly. We see this automatic effect in the current economic downturn. Finally, the interaction of three forces – a very large clientele (all pensioners, all the health insured), strong political organization or influence, and great mass popularity – means that welfare-state leaders have already achieved generosity of benefits; their citizens now have entrenched interests and strong sentiments for maintaining the status quo.